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This study contributes to current research on quantitative easing. We provide a novel 
analysis of the quantitative easing effectiveness as an unconventional monetary policy 
tool in Japan over the last two decades. The paper advances current research on 
quantitative easing by exploring quantitative easing through the prism of the monetary 
transmission mechanism. We examine the response of Japanese Regional Banks to the 
quantitative easing operations conducted by the Bank of Japan from the early 2000s till 
2015. The analysis is performed within the framework of the bank lending channel 
under the unconventional monetary policy strategies. We find that small-sized regional 
banks underline the significant positive effect of quantitative easing on gross domestic 
product and inflation that works through the securities holdings and leverage 
preferences. Monetary authorities should pay particular attention to policies for such 
banks and banks with a high level of non-performing loans. Deposit growth after a 
quantitative easing shock is only present in large sized banks with low NPLs holdings. 
JEL classification: G1; G21; G28; E52 




In 2001, the Bank of Japan (BOJ) was the first Central Bank that implemented 
into its operational policy an unconventional monetary instrument - quantitative easing. 
This was seen as a direct reaction to the sluggish economy and the fact that standard 
monetary stimulus was exhausted. Quantitative Easing (QE) was viewed as a possible 
monetary policy instrument that could help to reverse a negative inflation rate and to 
overcome the problems of the liquidity trap.   
The paper is underpinned by current research on QE effectiveness as an 
unconventional monetary policy tool in Japan over the last two decades. The study is 
based on the existing literature on QE that includes, for example, Yang and Zhou, 2016; 
Yang and Zhou, 2013; Girardin and Mousa, 2011; and Schenkelberg and Watzka, 2013 
among others. Our focus is, however, focused on exploring QE through the prism of 
the monetary transmission mechanism. We examine the response of Japanese Regional 
Banks to the QE activities conducted by BOJ in the early 2000s and the analysed period 
includes the global financial crisis (GFC). The analysis is performed within the 
framework of the bank lending and asset pricing channels under the unconventional 
monetary policy strategies. We use Regional Banks since these banks play a crucial 
role in lending activities to small- and medium-sized firms that have significant 
constraints in accessing capital markets (Van Rixtel, 2002). Moreover, the Japanese 
Regional Banks provide a distinctive platform for the examination of the long-lasting 
effect of non-performing loans (NPLs) on the implementation and effectiveness of the 
adopted quantitative easing strategies.1   
The contribution of the paper can be summarized as follows: Firstly, our study 
builds upon the previous theoretical models introduced by Tobin, 1970; Bernanke and 
Blinder, 1988; and recently Ramos-Tallada, 2015. Our model is based on the 
assumption of the existence of a competitive equilibrium in the loan market. We 
provide a unique decomposition of regional banks’ total loan growth into demand and 
supply factors that drive loan growth. Such a disaggregation allows us to detect whether 
supply driven loan growth is accompanied by a significant increase in bank capital in 
order to absorb any significant losses in the future. Such an analysis could provide 
information about the sensitivity of financial systems to possible exposures of future 
                                                          
1 Recently, Fukuyama, and Matousek (2017) show that Regional Banks have a large proportion of NPLs 




exogenous negative shocks. This is valuable information for policymakers in terms of 
the adoption of bank recapitalization measures. 
Secondly, we investigate the impact of QE thoroughly not only on supply and 
demand factors that drive loans but also on several other crucial bank decision 
parameters. These include securities and liquidity holdings, leverage ratio and deposits 
growth. As a result, we identify the banks’ portfolio preferences between liquidity, 
securities holdings and lending after a QE shock. Thus, we distinguish between “real 
economy” and “financial economy” effects, and our analysis is unique in terms of 
answering the question whether bank liquidity passes to financial markets or the real 
Japanese economy. By exploring the impact of securities holdings and lending on 
economic activity, we may provide evidence of an active asset pricing channel and/or 
an active bank lending channel through the QE process (see, for example, Ugai, 2007; 
Krishnamurthy and Vissing-Jorgensen, 2011; Joyce and Spaltro, 2014). Thus, the 
investigation of Japanese banks’ excess liquidity holdings implies increased risk 
aversion with a negative effect on economic activity. Such an analysis offers valuable 
information since it unveils how QE affects a balance sheet of Regional Banks, and 
thus the potential impact on the real economy. Furthermore, we also address the vital 
question of how QE affects banks of different size and different levels of NPLs 
(Gambacorta et al., 2014). This is of crucial importance, and the findings could direct 
the policy makers towards effective NPLs management policies. 
Thirdly, in terms of methodological contribution, we apply for this kind of 
analysis for the first time a PVAR by including bank-level data. In our model, the 
decomposed loans are treated as an endogenous variable in a system allowing for time-
lag reactions. Recent studies use a single lending equation in the general form within 
the panel data context (Ramos-Tallada, 2015; Bowman et al., 2015). It is important to 
underline the fact that the adopted methodological framework of PVAR reveals and 
provides new insights (Iacoviello and Navarro, 2019) that could be hidden from the 
methodologies that have been adopted in previous research studies.  
The paper is structured as follows. An overview of the Japanese monetary policy 
and banking since the middle 1980s is presented in section 2. Section 3 contains a brief 
review of the relevant literature followed, in section 4, by a description of the data and 
the methodology employed herein. The analysis of the results is conducted in section 5 
where the paper tries to provide plausible and tentative explanations for the different 




2. An overview of the Japanese monetary policy and banking since middle 1980s 
 
During the second half of the 1980s, Japan experienced a classic credit-induced real 
estate boom and financial assets’ bubble. This bubble was fueled by a malicious spiral 
of rising asset prices, higher collateral value and increasing bank credit. The factors that 
caused this type of asset bubble are frequently listed: the increased competition among 
commercial banks due to financial reforms that diminish the bank’s profit margin. That 
led banks to conduct riskier activities by expanding their lending to real estate and 
construction companies and non-bank financial institutions (Nakajima and Taguchi, 
1995). The specific financial structure (Keiretsu) within the Japanese financial market 
put a veil on the growing problems within the real economy. A further factor was the 
fact that the strict financial regulation imposed on banks forced them to be mostly 
oriented on lending activities (Hamada, 1995).  
Furthermore, the use of informal policy instruments and the presence of 
informal networks between monetary authorities and banks contributed also to the asset 
bubble. The administrative guidance regarding the lending policy, promulgated by the 
Ministry of Finance (MoF), was not very effective, most likely owing to a combination 
of political factors and the significant presence of MoF retirees on the boards of regional 
banks (Van Rixtel, 2002). Another serious problem was inadequate co-ordination 
between the MoF that used several informal macro monetary policy instruments that 
primarily affected the capital market, and the policy objectives of the BoJ focused on 
money markets. Furthermore, the ‘bubble’ was driven by the accommodative stance of 
Japanese monetary policy, partly caused by international exchange rate fluctuations and 
related pressure from the MoF (Hamada, 1995; Okina et al. 2000). Keeping the official 
discount rate at a historically low level of 2,5% until the end of May 1989 resulted in 
the creation of excess liquidity, and enabled the banking industry to resort to excessive 
lending activity.  
BoJ faced one of the most complex issues in the assessment of monetary policy, 
which is the co-existence of asset price ‘bubbles’ and price stability (Okina et al. 2000). 
However, in May 1989 inflationary pressures forced BoJ to adopt a restrictive monetary 
policy, which signaled the start of the collapse of the ‘bubble’, since the rise in interest 
rates deflated the value of assets such as land, real estate and stocks.  The sudden drops 
in the collateral value of loans caused severe problems for the Japanese banking 
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industry (Hamada 1995). As a direct consequence of the decreased value of loan 
collaterals banks became encumbered with NPLs and problems to meet bank capital 
adequacy ratios. The problems within the Japanese banking sector were also reflected 
by the continuing decline in their lending activities. The domestic demand for loans 
used to be fulfilled mainly by foreign banks, highlighting the problematic supply of 
loans by domestic banks (Van Rixtel, 2002).  
The initial general policy response to the crisis came in June 1996 by monetary 
authorities that passed six financial reform laws, to solve the bad loan situation and 
related collateral problems. Thereafter, the end of 1996 was characterized by the 
implementation of reform legislation, which aimed at the bailout of the collapsed 
housing loan companies and the strengthening of the Deposit Insurance Corporation. In 
June 1997, the Diet approved a new Bank of Japan Law that considerably increased the 
independence of the Japanese central bank. At the end of the same year, a number of 
major financial institutions collapsed, which could be interpreted as the end of the ‘too-
big-to-fail’ policy. The establishment of a new supervisory authority, the Financial 
Supervisory Agency (FSA) and the announcement by the MoF of a considerable 
decrease in the number of its informal circulars happened between June and October 
1998. According to FSA inspections conducted in collaboration with the BoJ, the 
second-tier regional banks had significantly understated the amount of their problem 
loan.  
In October 1998 the establishment of the Financial Reconstruction Commission 
(FRC) contributed significantly to the suppression of the Crisis. In relation to the FSA’s 
inspection results of regional banks, the FRC decided to inject ¥260 billion into three 
regional banks (Ashikaga Bank, Hokuriku Bank and Bank of the Ryukyus) and one 
second -tier regional bank (Hiroshima-Sogo Bank). Several banks were recapitalized 
using private money from their ‘main banks’, including Kanto Bank and Chiba Kogyo 
Bank, while in July 2000 further consolidation of bank supervision was attained by 
integrating the FSA and MoF’s Financial System Planning Bureau into the Financial 
Services Agency (FSEA). 
In 2000, the supervisory authorities continued to inject public funds into the 
banking system. A total of ¥170 billion in financial assistance was provided to four 
regional banks. Japanese short-term interest rates close to zero-lower bound and weak 
economic activity plagued by significant deflation risks led Bank of Japan (BoJ) to 
adopt the first round of an unconventional monetary policy strategy known as 
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quantitative easing (QE). The first QE program by BoJ constitutes an increase in the 
commercial bank current account balance (CAB) from ¥5 trillion to ¥35 trillion over a 
four-year period, known as a QE 1 program, starting in March 2001 and ending in 2005 
(Watanabe, & Yabu, 2013). 
The second wave of the turbulence came in 2008 when the USA and other 
advanced economies faced the collapse of the financial markets and the consequent 
credit crunch. This occurred when the Japanese economy was still in the process of 
stabilization. Even though BoJ claimed that the first QE did not meet expectations, BoJ 
launched the second round of QE on 4 August 2011. BoJ increased the commercial 
bank current account balance from ¥40 trillion to a total of ¥50 trillion. BoJ then further 
expanded its asset purchase program in October 2011, by ¥5 trillion to a total of ¥55 
trillion, and from ¥60 to ¥70 trillion a year on April 2013, and ¥80 trillion of bonds 
purchases a year on 31 October 2014. This latter QE program was accompanied by 
other government expansion measures and has been characterized in recent literature 
as an “Abenomics” period (De Michelis and Iacoviello, 2016), which is in contrast with 
the situation in the 1990s where the MoF was unwilling to boost public spending given 
its concern for the budgetary situation. Accordingly, the BoJ had to provide economic 
stimulation (Okina et al., 2000). 
 
3. Literature Review 
 
3.1 Bank Lending channel: Origin and the Direction of Contemporary Research   
 
Over the last three decades, there have been a number of the theoretical and empirical 
studies that attempt to explain how monetary policy is transmitted to the real economy. 
The most influential papers in these debates include King (1986) and Bernanke and 
Blinder (1988) that initiated a rigorous discussion on this topic. The prevalent credit 
view literature then examines a bank lending channel (BLC) under the conventional 
monetary instruments. They show that monetary policy shocks lead to the shift of 
banks’ loan supply schedules. When the central bank tightens its monetary policy and 
squeezes liquidity from the financial system, banks have to restructure their assets and 
reduce their reservable funds to nonreservable funds.  
Kashyap and Stein (2000) show that irreversible funds are affected by adverse 
selection problems and credit rationing. That means banks lose available funds for 
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underwriting new loans, which is reflected in the credit contraction to their bank-
dependent clients. Empirical research on BLC under the assumption of conventional 
monetary policy is extensive. These studies include Kishan and Opiela, (2000, 2006), 
Gambacorta and Marques-Ibanez, (2011), Olivero et al. (2011) among others. Another 
recent strand of the literature reflects on the low-interest-rate environment that leads 
banks to undertake risks affecting the efficient operation of the bank lending channel 
(Borio and Zhou, 2012; Altunbas et al., 2012; Delis et al., 2017).  
The use of the non-conventional monetary instrument - Quantitative Easing – 
by central bankers during the Global Financial Crisis (GFC) opens a new discussion on 
monetary policy effectiveness. In particular, how QE policy is transmitted to the real 
economy. Güntner (2015) introduces bank liquidity risk into a business cycle model. It 
is argued that asset purchases could prove ineffective because commercial banks form 
a large capital base and hold less liquidity. Likewise, Di Maggio and Kacperczyk (2017) 
claim that non-standard US monetary policies at the zero-lower bound (ZLB) created 
an adverse shock to the competitiveness of a significant part of the shadow banking 
system. That triggered lower capital supply to the financial and large corporate sectors 
and increased the financial market’s exposure to runs and defaults. 
In the case of the UK, Butt et al. (2014) argue that UK QE leads to ‘‘flighty’’ 
deposits in banks and thus diminishes the traditional bank lending channel. Joyce and 
Spaltro (2014) show that UK QE1 led to small but a statistically significant upward 
movement in bank lending growth, which was more effective within the segment of the 
small- and medium-sized banks. Low capitalization is found to impede the QE impact 
on bank lending. Churm et al. (2015) find that the UK Funding for Lending Scheme 
(FLS) reduces bank funding costs and increases incentives to lend.  
Similarly, Carpenter et al. (2014) provide evidence that unconventional actions 
taken in the US and the Euro area reduced bank funding volatility and that consequently 
led to the increased loan supply. The positive effect of US QE across the globe is found 
by Anaya et al. (2017) who report lower lending rates in EMEs, while Barroso et al. 
(2016) find a significant credit growth in Brazil. 
In the European context, Casiraghi et al. (2013) support the ECB’s 
unconventional practices and show that these practices led to higher credit supply in 
Italy. Darracq-Paries and De Santis (2015) argue that the ECB’s 3-year Long Term 
Refinancing Operations (LTROs) resulted in lower lending rate spreads. Similarly, 
Garcia-Posada and Marchetti (2016) find that the Very Long Term Refinancing 
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Operations (VLTROs) by the ECB had a modest positive effect on bank credit supply 
to firms in Spain, driven by credit to small- and medium-sized enterprises. Furthermore, 
this impact was larger for illiquid banks.  
 
3.2 Evidence for bank lending channel under unconventional policies in Japan 
 
In this subsection, we provide a summary and the identification of the gap of current 
research on QE in Japan. Japan was the first country that adopted the use of 
unconventional monetary policy. Since its introduction in 2001, a number of research 
studies were published on this topic. Kimura et al. (2003) and Ugai (2007) used 
aggregate macroeconomic data and failed to support any significant change in bank 
balance sheets during this first QE program. Shirakawa (2002) argues that a marginal 
effect of QE in Japan was caused by the fact that Japanese banks had a preference of 
holding liquidity because of the poor economic performance of the corporate sector and 
the Japanese economy as a whole. Hosono (2006) supports this result by showing that 
Japanese banks with stronger liquidity positions had lent more than those banks with 
less liquidity before the QE was adopted. Kobayashi et al. (2006) then find that 
increases in current account balances appeared to have benefited weaker banks with a 
higher bad-loan ratio, but they do not find a significant relationship between bank stock 
returns and liquidity position.  
Bowman et al. (2015) use bank-level data over the first period of QE. In their 
regression analysis, they find a positive response of lending to liquidity positions during 
the first year of the program. Nevertheless, the effect is small as interbank lending 
declined and it is more intense for weaker banks. Wang (2016) compares QE effects 
between Japan and the US, and finds that the positive effects on lending by large banks 
are more pronounced in the US. 
 
3.3 Weak evidence for other QE channels in Japan 
 
It is also necessary to highlight two major unconventional channels of monetary policy 
apart from BLC, which comprise the portfolio rebalancing and the signaling channel as 
discussed by Bernanke and Reinhart (2004). As for the portfolio rebalancing channel, 
BoJ purchased a large volume of long-term government bonds every month to reduce 
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long-term rates.2 That forced banks to rebalance their portfolios and boost economic 
activity. Oda and Ueda (2005) do not provide evidence for this type of unconventional 
channel in Japan due to fairly weak purchases. The signaling channel is broadly seen 
as a commitment of a central bank to yield curve control until the real economy 
rebounds (Eggertsson and Woodford, 2004; Krishnamurthy and Vissing-Jorgensen, 
2011). In the Japanese case, there is no anecdotal evidence as such (Okina and 
Shiratsuka, 2004; Baba et al., 2006). Similar results are found on signaling or portfolio 
balance effects in Japan by Bauer & Neely (2014) when studying the international effect 
of US unconventional policy. 
 
3.4 Evidence for QE effects on Japanese economic activity by using VAR models 
 
Recent studies that deploy Vector Autoregressive models (VAR) identify economic 
activity responses to unconventional monetary policy measures in Japan. Girardin and 
Moussa (2011) in a Markov-switching VAR show that quantitative easing prevented a 
further recession and deflation but also provided considerable stimulation to both 
output and prices. However, such a policy has to be accompanied by a healthy and 
strong financial system. Schenkelberg and Watzka (2013) apply a sign restriction 
structural VAR (SVAR) and show that the Japanese quantitative easing experiment was 
successful in temporarily stimulating real activity, but it did not lead to a persistent 
increase in inflation. Matsuki et al. (2015) provide further evidence that quantitative 
easing in Japan increases inflation rates, while qualitative easing spurs economic 
activity. Hanisch (2017) points out that the effectiveness of expansionary monetary 
policy differs with respect to the policy instruments used. A shock that decreases the 
short-term interest rate has a strong positive effect on output and a modest effect on 
prices. A monetary policy shock that expands the monetary base has a positive, but 
weak and somewhat transitory, effect on output, and a strong effect on goods and stock 
prices. Michaelis and Watzka (2017) use a time-varying parameter vector 
autoregression (TVP-VAR) model with a new set of sign restrictions to compare the 
effectiveness of QE policies over time on GDP and CPI in Japan. They find a more 
pronounced effect over the ‘Abenomics’ period compared to earlier QE periods. 
Gambacorta et al. (2014) by using a panel VAR framework find that a QE shock leads 
                                                          
2 BoJ used the same policy also in 2017 as a reaction to market turbulences.   
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to temporarily higher economic activity and consumer prices, with no differences in 
impacts across eight advanced economies including Japan.  
 
 
4. Data and Methodology  
 
4.1 Data - Demand vs supply driven loan growth 
 
In order to investigate a possible active bank lending channel in Japan, semi-annual 
data for 104 Regional I and Regional II banks have been collected from the Japanese 
Bank Association over the period from 2000 to 2015. We use the balanced panel data 
set that is combined in a panel VAR model with GDP, inflation, implied volatility index 
and central bank’s current account balance growth that is as an indicator of the 
enlargement of the BoJ balance sheet due to QE policy, as in Bowman et al., (2015). 
This account refers to banks’ liquid assets as the sum of vault cash, and deposits at the 
BOJ, thus indicating the liquidity provided by BoJ to banks. Regional banks in Japan 
are divided into two groups: Regional Banks I, and the Second Association of Regional 
Banks (also known as Regional Banks II), even though there are no functional 
differences between the two types. Henceforth we shall call them regional banks. Both 
groups of banks underwent several recapitalization programmes that had been 
introduced by the Government in order to stabilize the system and restore lending 
activities. Despite those activities, regional banks have been facing severe problems 
with their performance (Fukuyama and Weber, 2008; 2015; Assaf et al., 2011). So far 
regional banks’ activities have been restricted due to the lack of capital and accumulated 
NPLs.  
We construct accounting ratios for different bank assets and liabilities categories. 
The ratio of Liquid Assets/Total Assets includes cash, due-from-banks and call loans 
and provides information about the level of liquidity a bank holds, while the ratio of 
Securities/Total Assets provides insights about the securities holdings preferences of 
the bank. Deposit growth (Deposit_Growth) and capital adequacy (Equity/Total Assets) 
can be very informative concerning the ability of the bank to provide loans. The inverse 
of the latter ratio is also known as equity multiplier indicating the leverage of the bank. 
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Special attention is paid to the loan growth of regional banks that can add significantly 
to real economic activity given their lending specialization on small- and medium-sized 
firms (Fukuyama & Matousek, 2017).  
Figure 1a,b provide information on changes in current account balances as 
percentage of total assets by the BoJ along with the time evolution of the GDP index in 
logarithmic levels (1a) and inflation (1b). The BoJ conducted two QE programs. The 
first program captures the period from 2002 to 2005 and the second one captures the 
recent period accompanied by a series of easing fiscal measures (Abenomics period). 
What is interesting is the positive correlation with some time lag that seems to exist in 
some degree between QE and GDP or inflation. However, questions about the 
efficiency of the first QE program led to a more holistic easing economic policy over 
the last years. However, we have to mention that the absence of a QE program might 
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Fig. 1b. Inflation vs. changes in central bank 
reserves/assets 
Note: QE indicator shows the central bank’s current account balance growth throughout the study, 
and it is used as an indicator of the enlargement of the BoJ balance sheet due to QE policy 
 
In order to decompose loan growth into demand and supply driven, we refer to 
several studies (Tobin, 1970; Bernanke and Blinder, 1988) by assuming the existence 
of a competitive equilibrium which is characterized by equality among aggregated 
supply and demand loan curves with a nominal rate which clears the market.4 More 
recently, Ramos-Tallada (2015) also assumes the existence of a competitive 
                                                          
3http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/IDAN/2016/578994/IPOL_IDA(2016)578994_EN.pdf 
4However, in contrast to Bernanke and Blinder (1988) which are not assuming the existence of credit 
rationing, Stiglitz and Weiss (1981) provide a model in which aggregate demand and supply loan curves 
do not intersect and credit rationing exists.   
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equilibrium point among supply and demand loan curves and decomposes loans into 
demand and supply driven. Specifically, in Figure 1c, we can observe a clearing market 
for loans where a loan supply function (LS) that is positively related to the lending rate 
(rL) and a loan demand function (LD) that is negatively related to rL. Then the initial 
equilibrium price and quantity of loans are given by the intersection of demand and 
supply for loans at point A. The interest revenues from loans in the second half of the 
fiscal year over the amount of total outstanding gross loans during the first half can be 
used as a proxy for the lending rate for each bank. Then first differences of this variable 
are calculated in order to proxy lending rate changes (ΔrL).  
When a positive loan growth (ΔL) occurs with a positive increase in lending rate 
changes (ΔrL), then this loan growth may be attributed to the demand-driven loan shift 
as can be seen in Figure 1b (movement from A to C, or movement of LD to LD’). 
Otherwise, when positive loan growth coexists with a negative change in the price of 
loans, then this positive growth in the amount of loans may be attributed to a supply-
driven shift (movement from A to B or movement of LS to LS’). Therefore, by using a 
dummy variable, the loan growth has been decomposed into supply- (Loan_Growth_S) 
and demand-driven loan growth (Loan_Growth_D), depending on whether loan 
changes times lending rate changes equals a positive or a negative number.  
 
Fig. 1c. Supply versus demand- driven loan growth. Note:  LS indicates the loan supply curve, while LD 
is the loan demand curve. Point A is the initial equilibrium point, while points B and C are new 
equilibrium points achieved after supply- and demand- driven factors, respectively. 
 
Table 1 presents mean and standard deviation for the whole sample of regional 
banks as well as for the two sub-samples based on the size and the level of NPLs. The 
criterion of dividing banks into two subgroups is the median of asset size and the 
median of NPLs. We observe from Table 1 that the loan growth can be mainly attributed 
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to supply-driven rather than demand-driven forces. Large banks, as expected, have on 
average higher growth rates for loans and deposits, and securities holdings compared 
to smaller banks. Smaller banks although having similar Equity/Assets ratios, and 
maintaining higher levels of liquid assets, show higher levels of NPLs.  
 
Table 1 Descriptive Statistics for Assets and Liabilities elements   
  Whole Sample Large Size Small Size High values of NPLs Low values of NPLs 
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. 
Loan_Growth 0.76 5.88 0.98 6.15 0.55 5.58 0.31 6.57 1.19 5.11 
Loan_Growth_D 0.02 5.66 0.11 5.97 -0.08 5.32 -0.05 6.39 0.08 4.86 
Loan_Growth_S 0.75 1.61 0.87 1.55 0.62 1.65 0.36 1.49 1.11 1.63 
Deposit_Growth 1.02 3.53 1.17 3.63 0.86 3.42 0.63 4.11 1.38 2.83 
Liquid 
Assets/TA 
6.05 3.02 5.45 2.85 6.66 3.07 6.38 2.74 5.74 3.24 
Securities/TA 24.34 7.44 27.18 7.54 21.48 6.13 21.79 6.27 26.77 7.65 
Deposits/TA 89.51 3.80 87.57 3.81 91.47 2.61 90.71 3.27 88.37 3.93 
Equity/TA 4.49 1.07 4.64 1.10 4.34 1.01 4.42 1.11 4.56 1.02 
NPLs/TA 3.39 1.93 2.80 1.51 3.99 2.11 4.83 1.83 2.02 0.45 
TA 2,777,416 2,285,706 4,417,695 2,159,398 1,121,777 578,068 2,069,121 1,794,613 3,449,861 2,490,200 
Notes: By dividing the whole sample into two groups based on the mean values of total assets and NPLs 
we calculate descriptive statistics for variables of interest in each sub-sample 
 
When we analyze the subgroups of banks based on variations in NPLs 
interesting findings arise. More specifically, banks with low levels of NPLs indicate on 
average higher growth rates for loans and deposits and do keep more securities 
holdings. These findings cause our empirical investigation to be established via the 
following two steps. Firstly, we estimate our basic VAR model and then we re-estimate 
our model for two different subgroups based on the size and risk measure of NPLs, in 
order to identify any heterogeneity among our findings.  
 
4.2. Model setup 
 
4.2.1 The Conventional Single equation approach  
 
The conventional model adopted by the literature for testing the bank lending channel 
uses a single-equation general form in a panel data context (see for instance 
Gambacorta, 2003; Altunbas et al. 2010; Ramos-Tallada, 2015; Bowman et al., 2015). 




𝛥𝑙𝑜𝑔𝐿𝑖,𝑡+𝑗 = 𝐶 + 𝛽𝑖𝛥𝑙𝑜𝑔𝐿𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽𝑠𝑅𝑠,𝑡 + ∑ 𝛽𝑘(𝑅𝑠,𝑡𝑋𝑘,𝑖,𝑡)
𝐾
𝑘=1 + ∑ 𝛽𝑚(𝑋𝑚,𝑖,𝑡)
𝑀
𝑚=1 +
𝑒𝑖,𝑡+𝑗    𝑖 = 1, … , 𝑁   𝑡 = 1, … , 𝑇 𝑒𝑖,𝑡+𝑗 ~ 𝑖𝑖𝑑(0, ∑ )𝑒        (1) 
 
where 𝛥𝑙𝑜𝑔𝐿𝑖,𝑡+𝑗 is the first difference of logarithmic loans between t and t+j periods, 
𝑅𝑠,𝑡 the policy rate over period t and 𝑋 a vector of exogenous precautionary or 
diversification variables that can affect directly loan growth or indirectly via the lending 
channel. The total marginal impact of 𝑅𝑠,𝑡 on 𝛥𝑙𝑜𝑔𝐿𝑖,𝑡+𝑗 is therefore given by the 




4.2.2 The Panel VAR proposed Approach 
 
However, single equation studies identify the main determinants of bank lending 
without taking into account any feedback effects of lending on other variables and 
without highlighting the transmission channel of monetary policy on the real economy. 
Since Sims’ (1980) seminal paper, the typical framework to investigate monetary policy 
transmission mechanisms, including a bank lending channel, is the standard VAR 
framework5
. The main advantage of using a VAR model is that it allows for dynamic 
interdependencies among all variables that are treated as endogenous. The 
characteristic presentation of a VAR model in applied macroeconomics has the 
following form:  
 
𝑉𝑡 = 𝐵0(𝑡) + 𝐵(𝑙)𝑉𝑡−1 + 𝐴𝑢𝑡    𝑢𝑡~𝑖𝑖𝑑(0, ∑ )𝑢  (2) 
 
Where 𝑉𝑡 is a G x 1 vector of endogenous variables and 𝐵(𝑙) is a polynomial in 
the lag operator, while the deterministic components of the data are incorporated into 
𝐵0(𝑡).  A is the contemporaneous impact matrix of the mutually uncorrelated 
disturbances u. 
                                                          
5Yang and Zhou (2013, 2016) have extensively highlighted the advantages of applying structural VAR 
models investigating both credit risk spill-overs among financial institutions and volatility spill-overs 
during unconventional monetary policy periods. 
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The Panel Vector Autoregressive models (PVAR) treat all variables as 
endogenous and independent, but with the cross-sectional dimension that can be 
represented as follows:  
 
𝑣𝑖𝑡 = 𝐵0𝑖(𝑡) + 𝐵𝑖(𝑙)𝑉𝑡−1 + 𝐴𝑖𝑢𝑖𝑡    𝑖 = 1, … , 𝑁   𝑡 = 1, … , 𝑇   (3) 
 
Where 𝑉𝑡 is a stacked version of 𝑣𝑖𝑡, the vector  of G variables for each unit i, 
i.e. 𝑉𝑡 = (𝑣1𝑡
′ , … , 𝑣𝑁𝑡
′ ), and 𝑢𝑖𝑡 = [𝑢1𝑡
′ , 𝑢2𝑡
′ , … , 𝑢𝑁𝑡
′ ]′~𝑖𝑖𝑑(0, 𝛴) is the 𝐺 × 1 vector of 
contemporaneously correlated random disturbances with zero mean and the non-
singular variance–covariance matrix Σ. Ai is the contemporaneous impact matrix of the 
mutually uncorrelated disturbances ui for each bank i. 
Canova and Ciccarelli (2013) show that Bayesian panel VARs are particularly 
suited to analyse the transmission of idiosyncratic shocks across units and time, and to 
construct average effects across a heterogeneous group of units. Moreover, it may be 
used to examine the extent of dynamic heterogeneity among endogenous group units.  
The use of the PVAR model also allows us to combine variables like GDP, 
inflation rate, Japanese implied stock market volatility (VIX) and the central bank 
current account balance (CAB). This captures general economic and monetary 
conditions with the above-mentioned bank-specific variables and investigates any 
dynamic interactions among them as in the case of UK banks (Aiyar et al., 2016, 
Philippas et al., 2019). Banks’ dynamic responses to QE shock with short time-series 
information can be obtained in a PVAR. Among major advantages of this technique is 
that it accounts for individual bank characteristics at the level of the variables by 
introducing fixed effects and isolating the response of the bank credit channel to 
macroeconomic shocks, while allowing for unobserved bank heterogeneity (Frame et 
al., 2012; Love & Turk-Ariss, 2014).  
A general reduced form of our main estimated model is presented below by treating 
all variables as endogenous and allowing time lags across variables. In other words, a 
first order Panel Vector Autoregressive (PVAR6) model of the following form is 
estimated: 
 
                                                          
6 Our type of the panel vector autoregression model (PVAR) was initially developed by Love and 





𝑣𝑖𝑡 = 𝛤0 + 𝛤1𝑣𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝑓𝑖 + 𝑝𝑡 + 𝐴𝑖𝑢𝑖𝑡    𝑖 = 1, … , 𝑁   𝑡 = 1, … , 𝑇  (4) 
 
where 𝑣𝑖𝑡   is a nine-variable vector {GDP in logarithmic level, inflation, VIX, QE, 
Loan_Growth_S, Loan_Growth_D, Liquid/TA, Deposit_Growth, Equity/TA}.  
GDP and inflation are the two critical measures of economic performance that 
usually focus on central bank; implied volatility index (VIX) is well known in the 
financial literature as a “fear index” and covers any financial turmoil, while QE instead 
of policy rate is the main monetary policy instrument at zero lower bound of interest 
rates. The rest variables capture a series of bank management issues concerning 
liquidity preference versus security holdings, lending, capital and leverage issues. 
In our model “individual heterogeneity” is allowed among variables by 
introducing fixed effects, denoted by fi in equation (4). Additionally, country-specific 
time dummies tp , are added to equation (4) to capture aggregate, global shocks that may 
affect all banks in the same way.  
Since the panel VAR model is estimated, impulse response analysis is applied. 
In this type of analysis, the isolated random shock to each variable is identified by a 
mixture of zero and sign restrictions as in Eickmeier and Hofmann, (2013); Gambacorta 
et al., (2014); Hanisch (2017); Schenkelberg and Watzka (2013). Confidence intervals 
are generated using Monte Carlo simulations. More specifically, we assume that there 
is only a lagged impact of QE shock on GDP and inflation, or simply the 
contemporaneous impact of QE on both variables is restricted to be zero. Innovations 
on GDP, inflation, stock market implied volatility and rest bank variables are allowed 
to have an immediate effect on BoJ balance sheet. Moreover, we assume that 
unconventional policy reduces implied stock market volatility, although the QE may 
immediately respond to VIX. By incorporating a risk/volatility index in the PVAR and 
by conditioning the QE shock on this indicator, we can disentangle exogenous 
innovations to the central bank balance sheets from endogenous responses to financial 
market risk. At this point, we have to mention also that identify the shock recursively, 
i.e. by the Cholesky decomposition where the individual banks’ balance sheets 
variables ordered last, implies that the macroeconomic variables do not react 
contemporaneously to shocks to the individual banks’ variables (Kilian & Lütkepohl, 
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2017). Thus, the identifying assumptions in our paper as in Gambacorta et al., 2014 are 
summarized in Table 27: 
 
Table 2 Identification of An Unconventional Monetary policy Shock 
Output Prices VIX Central Bank Assets 
0 0 ≤0 >0 
 
In our model, let 𝑣𝑡 be the history for 𝑣𝑡, 𝜑
𝑡 the trajectory for the coefficients 
up to t, 𝛺𝑡 the trajectory for the variance coefficients up to t. Then by letting:   
𝑣𝑡+1
𝑡+𝜏 = [𝑣𝑡+1
′ , … , 𝑣𝑡+𝜏
′ ]′ to be a collection of future observations  
𝜑𝑡+1
𝑡+𝜏 = [𝜑𝑡+1
′ , … , 𝜑𝑡+𝜏
′ ]′ to be a collection of future trajectories for 𝜑𝑡 




′ ] , where 𝑢1,𝑡
′  are shocks to the endogenous variables   
𝜉𝑗,𝑡
𝛿  to be a realization of 𝜉𝑗,𝑡 of size δ  
and 𝐹𝑡
1, 𝐹𝑡
2 two conditioning sets as follows: 
𝐹𝑡
1 = {𝑣𝑡 ,  𝜑𝑡, 𝛺𝑡, 𝐽𝑡 , 𝑊, 𝜉𝑗,𝑡
𝛿 , 𝜉−𝑗,𝑡, 𝜉𝑡+1
𝑡+𝜏} 
𝐹𝑡
2 = {𝑣𝑡 ,  𝜑𝑡, 𝛺𝑡, 𝐽𝑡 , 𝑊, 𝜉𝑡, 𝜉𝑡+1
𝑡+𝜏} 
 
Where 𝜉−𝑗,𝑡 indicates all shocks excluding the one in the j-th component, and 𝐽𝑡 
satisfies the following condition 𝐽𝑡𝐽𝑡
′ = 𝛴𝑢. Then equation (5) produces the traditional 
impulse response function at horizon τ to a θ impulse in 𝜉𝑗,𝑡, j=1,…k : 
 
𝐼𝑅𝑣
𝑗(𝑡, 𝜏) = 𝛦(𝑣𝑡+𝜏|𝐹𝑡
1) - 𝛦(𝑣𝑡+𝜏|𝐹𝑡
2), τ=1,2,.., 10     (5) 
 
Next, we divide our sample into sub-samples based on the size of banks and 
their level of NPLs as a measure of risk. That allows us some degree of heterogeneity 
among banks in the impulse response analysis. If we compare responses across the 
whole sample and subgroups, we may observe key information about our findings in 
our main model. 
                                                          




Suppose that we run the model for one group of regional banks with high NPLs, 
denoted as 𝑑, from the full-panel sample. Therefore, the restricted vector to be 
estimated in equation (4) is now specified as: 
 
𝑉𝑡
∗ = [𝑣′1,𝑑,𝑡 … 𝑣′𝑁,𝑑,𝑡] (6) 
 
where 𝑉𝑡
∗ is the 𝑘𝑖,𝑑 × 1 vector of endogenous variables for unit 𝑖, 𝑖 = 1, … , 𝑁 and  𝑑  
denotes the banks with high values of NPLs holdings examined for the restricted model. 
By allowing heterogeneous responses between small versus large banks, and between 
banks with low versus high values of NPLs, further evidence on the GDP, inflation and 
other bank variables responses to QE shocks will be provided. 
 
5. Empirical Results 
 
5.1 Impulse Response Analysis based on our basic model  
 
Figure 2 presents the response of all macro/finance variables of interest to a 
positive QE shock. By restricting the VIX response to be negative and QE response to 
be positive, to the positive QE shock, we focus on real GDP and inflation responses. In 
contrast with previous studies (see, for instance, Bowman et al., 2015) indicating a 
weakly positive response of GDP on QE, our study highlights a significant positive 
response. The peak of this positive response is achieved after almost three semesters. 
Moreover, worth mentioning is the positive and statistically significant response of 
inflation to QE shock, which holds for almost six semesters. This latter highlights the 
effectiveness of this policy not only on GDP but also on price levels. The enlargement 
of the BoJ assets accompanied by the significant reduction in implied volatility index 










Responses of the macro/finance variables to a QE shock 
 
 
Fig. 2. Responses of the macro/finance variables to a QE shock. The blue line represents the median 
estimate of the response. The shadow blue area around the median estimate line of the response represents 
the statistically significant 95% confidence bands generated from 5000 Monte Carlo bootstrap 
resampling. 
  
Figure 3 then shows the mean group Panel VAR response of all bank variables 
of interest to the QE shock. The immediate reduction of the Equity/Assets ratio, which 
is in line with the previous study by Philippas et al., (2019) for UK banks, implies an 
increase in leverage that is accompanied by the significant although short-lived increase 
in the growth rate of loans that are characterized as supply-driven. It is worth 
mentioning that demand-driven loan growth is reduced, which implies that studies 
treating the total amount of loans without identifying loan supply in contrast with loan 
demand may provide wrong signals about the existence of a bank-lending channel. 
Deposit growth also responds positively but weakly and instantly as part of the money 
multiplier effects. As far as bank portfolio composition is concerned the liquid assets 
and the securities expressed as the percentage of total assets increase significantly. 
What is interesting is that the positive effect on liquidity holdings lasts for almost five 
periods, while the effect on security holdings holds for almost nine periods. This later 
result seems to provide evidence for the weak positive response on lending growth and 
underlines the importance of financial markets in the transmission of this policy to the 
real economy and prices. Moreover, an increase in security holdings implies an increase 




Responses of the bank variables to a QE shock 
 
 
Fig. 3. Responses of the bank variables to a QE shock. The blue line represents the median estimate of 
the response. The shadow blue area around the median estimate line of the response represents the 
statistically significant 95% confidence bands generated from 5000 Monte Carlo bootstrap resampling. 
 
 
5.2 Robustness checks allowing for size and NPLs holdings heterogeneity 
In order to investigate further the robustness of our findings, we re-estimate our 
basic model by allowing firstly heterogeneous responses between small and large 
banks, and secondly between banks holding low versus high levels of non-performing 
loans (NPLs).  
As can be seen from Figure 4, there is no distinction in the responses of VIX to 
a positive QE shock when taking into account bank size. However, the positive response 
of inflation, GDP and security holdings to the QE policy is higher for small- versus 
large-sized banks, highlighting their importance for the economic activity of Japan. 
Leverage effects are more prevalent in small- versus large-sized banks when looking at 




Responses to QE shock by treating different bank groups based on size 
 
 
Fig. 4. Responses to QE shock by treating different bank groups based on size. Dotted lines refer to 







Large- in contrast to small-sized banks provide more loans, and in such cases, 
QE policy presents higher time persistence.  Higher deposit growth response for large- 
versus small-sized banks after a QE shock highlights the higher confidence of deposit 
clients vis-à-vis large-sized banks. An interesting finding is also the higher time 
persistence on liquidity holdings for large-sized banks. 
By looking on Figure 5, although there is no distinction in responses of liquidity 
holdings, QE and VIX on QE shocks between banks with high versus low levels of 
NPLs, there is a slight distinction among supply-driven loans, GDP and inflation 
responses to QE shock. Banks with high values of NPLs can contribute more on GDP, 
inflation and supply-driven loans increase due to the QE shock. Time persistence of 
leverage response to QE shock is higher for this type of banks. On the opposite, higher 
deposit growth and reduced demand-driven loans are found after a QE shock on banks 
with low NPLs holdings. Moreover, banks with high NPLs increase slightly more their 
security holdings in contrast to banks with low NPLs holdings. 
 






Fig. 5. Responses to QE shock by treating different bank groups based on NPLs holdings. Dotted lines 
refer to responses by small sized banks, while continuous lines refer to responses by large sized banks. 
 
Summing up, the large-sized banks with high values of NPLs holdings are more 
responsible for the immediate positive supply-driven loan growth. This type of banks 
also attracts an increase in deposit growth over quantitative easing policies. While, 
small-sized banks with high NPLs holdings contribute more to GDP, inflation and 
security holdings. Moreover, for this type of banks, the immediate drop in the 
Equity/Asset ratio after an unexpected positive shock to the QE variable, presents 
higher time persistence, implying higher leverage signals.  
 
6. Conclusion 
The paper examines the effectiveness of QE conducted by BoJ by analyzing the 
interaction between BoJ’s activities in terms of QE operations and banks’ assets and 
liabilities composition. Based on the analysis we may summarize our results as follows:   
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Firstly, we find that the immediate drop of the Equity/Asset ratio due to a positive QE 
shock implies that the degree of leverage is increased for banks, especially for small-
sized banks with high NPLs holdings. Therefore, evidence for the risk-taking channel 
of monetary policy is provided in line with Borio and Zhou (2012) in the US case. 
According to this risk-taking channel, a monetary easing environment can help banks 
to undertake higher risks by increasing their lending activity. Once QE strategies are 
adopted by BoJ, banks’ risk appetite is increasing.  
Secondly, GDP, inflation response to QE is positively strong and long-lasting. 
Small-sized banks with high levels of NPLs holdings contribute more in this direction. 
Worth mentioning at this point is that the low level of NPLs holdings by large-sized 
banks is the main driving factor also of the positive deposit growth response to the QE 
positive shock.   
Thirdly, the increased securities holdings to a monetary easing shock are present 
in all types of banks, but this effect is higher on small-sized banks with a high level of 
NPLs holdings. If we combine this latter finding with the result that loan supply is 
positive although short-lived only for small-sized banks with high NPLs, we can 
understand their importance in the transmission of QE policies on prices and real 
activity. In terms of liquid asset responses to a positive QE shock, all banks have an 
immediate positive preference for liquidity. There should be incentives for banks by 
monetary authorities to use this liquidity for lending.  
Moreover, the main implication of these findings is that monetary authorities 
should not be very restrictive on policies about capital requirements by small-sized 
banks with high values of NPLs holdings since this type of banks has beneficial effects 
on lending and the effectiveness of the QE policy transmission to prices and the real 
economy. 
 Additional measures should be implemented by BoJ to transform the extra 
liquidity kept by banks to loans. Therefore, monetary authorities should pay particular 
attention to policies for large-sized banks with a low level of NPLs, to help them 
improve their lending supply. Moreover, policies force banks to hold fewer securities 
and provide more loans, which can contribute to prices and higher GDP growth since 
the preference holding of a significant amount of securities deprives the real economy 
of these funds.  
Finally, we have to mention at this point that using the balance sheet as the QE 
policy instrument can be restrictive. The central bank’s balance sheet reflects the 
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implementation of QE. However, like many other studies document, the announcement 
of QE can also have a strong impact on the economy. Therefore, future research should 
be focused on other aspects of unconventional monetary policy, such as forward 
guidance and other measures of economic activity like economic sentiment indicators. 
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